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Stimulating Fear Reduction:
Visual Stimulus, Verbal and
Spatial Concentration and Their
Effects on Fear
Studies have suggested that visual stimuli evoking
positive emotions may counter the effects of
negative emotions. A high level of involvement in a
distracting task may reduce the severity of negative
emotions. This study combined visual stimuli with
level of mental involvement to determine if they
had an effect on fear. It was posited that two types
of visual stimuli—amusing and spatial—would lower
fear, and a high level of involvement with each
stimulus would enhance this effect. The stimuli were
delivered over the Internet. Fear level was measured
using the self-report for the word "afraid" from
PANAS. A significant interaction between type of
stimulus and level of involvement was found, p =
.05. The results may indicate that spatial
concentration without mental verbalization
decreases fear level. Viewing amusing stimulus may
also reduce fear, but this may only be true when it is
viewed passively. The effect of fear reduction may
be reduced when the person elaborates about the
amusing stimulus using language.

A chimpanzee sits high in the forest canopy
when he hears the crack of a branch breaking
nearby. He looks over to see another male chimp,
from a neighboring population, charging with hair
on end. The first chimp's eyebrows furrow, and
his mouth purses in anger. He gets up to fight
and realizes that five adult males accompany his
challenger. He grimaces and screams, drops his
dinner and jumps 10 meters to the ground below.
He scrambles into the brush, barely escaping with
his life.
Negative emotions such as anger and fear are
activating. They cause us to take action, such as
fight or flee. We do not have to consider whether
to run when we are frightened. The fear emotion
moves us to react. There was evolutionary benefit

for our ancestors to have built-in responses,
triggered by emotion (Tomkins, 1991). Each
emotion has distinct motivational properties and
serves adaptive functions (Abe a Izard, 1999a).
Many of the negative emotions are activating and
drive us to take one of just a few actions. A
number of positive emotions may be deactivating
and serve to broaden our choices for how to
respond (Fredrickson, 1998). The potentially
deactivating properties of positive emotions,
coupled with the automatic emotional response
to external stimuli, has lead researchers to
investigate the possibility that certain positive
emotions can be triggered in order to undo the
effects of negative emotions. Fredrickson and
Levenson (1998) suggested positive emotions of
1

contentment and amusement act to return the
individual to a relaxed condition after the readied
state of a negative emotion, and in an experiment
they showed that self-reported and physiological
changes, which occurred after viewing fear
evoking stimulus, could be countered with
amusing stimulus.
However, some of their data was inconsistent
with earlier research. Ekman, Levenson and
Friesen (1983) found that fear increases heart
rate. In the Fredrickson and Levenson study
(1998), the stimulus that was intended to provoke
fear lowered heart rate. Their first stimulus may
have only provoked interest, which is generally
considered a positive emotion, unrelated to fear
(Fredrickson, 1998). Because of this problem, it
is important to test their idea that amusement
can counter fear by using a different methodology.
Researchers have theorized that rumination
tends to increase negative emotions and prolong
their effects, whereas distracting involvement has
the opposite effect (Lyubomirski, Caldwell, a
Noten-Hoeksema, 1998; Rusting Et NolenHoeksema, 1998). Lyubomirski, Caldwell and
Nolen-Hoeksema defined ruminating response as
"thinking about how sad, apathetic, and tired one
feels...wondering about the causes of one's
depressive symptoms...and worrying about their
implications" (Lyubomirski et al., p. 166). The
researchers found that rumination caused
depressed participants to have more negative
affect, and involvement with a distracting task
lead depressed participants to have less negative
affect. Neither response style had an effect on
those without depression—their negative affect
level did not change.
Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema (1998) have
proposed that the effect of involved or distracted
versus ruminating response style can be
broadened to include other negative emotions,
and they tested that theory on anger. According
to the associative-network approach, the pattern
of effects that rumination and involvement have
on anger should be similar to their impact on
depressed mood—rumination should increase
anger, and involvement with a distracting task
should decrease anger. To induce a state of
involvement they used a story completion task,
where they would start a sentence such as, "An
older person is talking to a younger person," and
then the participant had 5 minutes to write the
end of the story (Rusting a Nolen-Hoeksema,
7

1998). They found that while rumination did
increase anger, involvement had little effect.
Henriques and Davidson (1997) found
selective impairment of spatial, compared with
verbal, tasks in depressed participants, perhaps
supporting the idea that spatial areas of the brain
underfunction in those with depression when
compared with verbal regions. The associative
networks theory states that different negative
emotions may be related, and there is precedent
for testing whether a response related to one
negative emotion has an effect on another
negative emotion (Rusting a Nolen-Hoeksema,
1998). So in this experiment the researcher
combined these two ideas, and spatial stimulation
was tested to see if it had an effect on fear.
There are several limitations in past
experiments that the current research addresses.
Fredrickson and Levenson (1998) may not have
adequately demonstrated that they had truly
elicited fear, and so their assertion that
amusement counters fear is in doubt. Second,
the effect of involvement has not been tested on
fear, but it has been shown to have an effect on
depression (Lyubomirski, Caldwell, Et NolenHoeksema, 1998). Finally, spatial abilities may
be related to depression (Henriques EC Davidson,
1997), but spatial stimulation has not been tested
on fear. There is evidence that when something
effects one negative emotion, it may have a
similar effect on other negative emotions (Rusting
a Nolen-Hoeksema). Involvement has not been
paired with different types of stimuli to see if
they interact to have an effect on fear—it could
be that involvement enhances stimuli. Perhaps
the puppy film was very distracting in Fredrickson
Et Levenson (1998), and the other films were dull
and allowed participants to ruminate. So it could
be that involvement is a confounding variable,
or perhaps involvement with stimuli causes an
enhanced effect. For those reasons the current
experiment was designed to examine the effects
of stimuli and involvement on fear.
The hypothesis tested was that both amusing
stimuli and spatial stimuli would lower fear levels
in participants. It was further predicted that level
of involvement would interact with stimuli to
create an enhanced effect in lowering fear even
further. To test these hypotheses, participants
were exposed to either amusing, spatial or control
stimulus on a computer screen through an Internet
browser. They were given instructions that

created either a low or high level of involvement
with the stimuli. Then their fear level was
determined by administering the complete
positive and negative affect scale (PANAS) and
analyzing their response for the word "afraid."
In this way, the level reported for the scale item
of "afraid" was used to operationalize the
emotion of fear.

A main effect of stimulus was predicted, such
that the participants in the amusing and spatial
levels would have lower fear compared with
participants in the control level. An interaction
was predicted between stimulus and involvement
such that there would be a greater reduction of
fear in participants when stimuli were paired with
high involvement. The amusing and spatial levels
of stimulus were compared with the control in
an analysis of variance test (ANOVA). The control
served as a baseline level of fear, the amount of
experienced by people without any manipulation.
Many studies of emotion use stimulus to invoke
an emotion. The current study differed in this
respect and looked at changes in baseline
emotional states.
Materials
A software program was designed to
administer the treatments and the PANAS test
over the Internet. A male experimenter
programmed the study to run on an Internet
server, accessed by participants with a web
browser. The program was written in Visual Basic
6.0, running under Internet Information Server
4.0 on a Windows NT web server, with data
collected in SQL Server 6.5 (Microsoft
Corporation, Redmond, Washington) and analyzed
in SPSS 10.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois).
Procedure
An e-mail was sent to potential participants,
and they took part in the study by clicking on a
link in the e-mail. This launched an Internet
browser that then ran the experimental program.
Participants read a description of the study and
gave informed consent. The program assigned
participants to conditions randomly, with both
participants and the experimenter blind to
experimental conditions.
A different screen image was presented for
each of the three stimulus levels: a) the control/
no stimulus level had a black screen, b) the
amusing level had a photograph of goats, and c)
the spatial level had patterns of dots that were
the same color and general pattern as the goats,
but were sparse and not obviously animals. In
the low level of involvement, participants were
given little instruction. In the high involvement
level, participants were instructed to make up a
story. In the spatial image, high involvement
condition the instructions were modified to
encourage spatial thoughts (and discourage verbal
ones) in order not to confound the spatial

METHOD
Participants
One hundred three people in the USA and
Japan participated. Data were analyzed for the
94 people that completed all scale items-57
women and 37 men between the ages of 19 and
75, M = 36.32, SD = 12.73. This sample included
87 Caucasians, 2 Asians and 5 people who did not
list their ethnicity. The participants took part in
the experiment individually and were unpaid
volunteers. They were treated in accordance with
ethical principals for experimental psychology
involving human participants and gave informed
consent.
Design
A 3 x 2 factorial experiment was used. The
first factor was stimulus: a) control/no
stimulation—participants viewed a blank
computer screen, b) amusing stimulus—
participants viewed a photograph of several goats
standing in and next to a road, one of them
kneeling in the grass looking at or eating
something, and c) spatial stimulus—participants
viewed a patterns of dots in colors and patterns
that were similar to those in the amusing level,
but the shapes were not obviously animals.
The second factor was involvement: a) low—
participants were not instructed what to think
about when viewing the stimulus, and b) high—
participants were instructed to make up a story
if they were in the control level of stimulus, to
make up a story about the goats if they were in
the amusing stimulus level and to picture the
objects that the dots represented in the spatial
level. This way of operationalizing involvement
is similar to Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema's
experiment (1998), where participants in the high
involvement level were asked to make up a story
that finished a partial sentence that they were
given. The dependent variable was fear, measured
using a self-report for the word "afraid" mixed
in with the 19 other words from PANAS (Watson,
Clark, Et Tellegan, 1988).
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stimulation. The instructions in this case were to
look for patterns in the dots without using
language and compare sizes of shapes that the
patterns formed, dismissing any verbalization that
came to mind by thinking "that's language" and
then going back to the spatial task comparing sizes
without using words.
The stimuli were delivered for sixty seconds.
The entire PANAS test (Watson et al., 1988) was
then administered using the question prefix for
current affect, specifying that the participant
should rate their feelings for that moment in time
(Watson et al., 1988).

RESULTS
A two-way, between-subjects ANOVA was used
to test the predictions that both amusing and
spatial stimuli would tower fear, and involvement
would have an enhancing effect to lower fear to
a high degree. There were no significant main
effects, but an interaction was found between
stimulus and involvement, F(2, 88) = 3.21, p =
.05 (Figure 1).
While there was a significant interaction
between stimulus and involvement, an LSD
planned comparison found no significant
differences between fear levels in any of the
conditions; so this analysis will discuss the
direction of the differences suggested by the
interaction with the qualification that there were
no significant simple main effects. The hypothesis
was that both an amusing photograph and spatial
image would lower fear, and that high
involvement in a task related to the image would
reduce fear even more. Contrary to those
predictions fear was slightly higher in the involved
levels for both the amusing stimulus and the
control stimulus. But in the direction
corresponding to predictions, fear was lower
when high involvement was combined with the
spatial stimulus when compared to low
involvement with the spatial stimulus (Figure 1).
Participants rated their fear level by
responding on a 1 to 5 scale for the word "Afraid,"
with 1 signifying very little fear and 5, extreme
fear. In the control stimulus (black screen) with
low involvement (no task) condition, participants
averaged a low fear level, M = 1.14, SD = 0.36.
With control stimulus and high involvement (make
up a story), participants averaged a slightly higher
level of fear, M = 1.40, SD = 0.91. In the amusing

stimulus (comical photograph) with low
involvement (no task) condition, all participants
indicated the lowest level of fear possible on the
scale, and there was no variance whatever, with
M = 1.00, SD = 0.00. In the amusing stimulus with
high involvement (make up a story) condition,
participants averaged a higher fear level, M =
1.25, SD = 0.77. Exposed to spatial stimulus
(patterns of dots) with low involvement (no task),
participants had a higher fear level, M = 1.41, SD
= 0.80, when compared to participants who
viewed spatial stimulus with high involvement
(mentally compare pattern sizes and imagine
what the patterns look like without using
language), M = 1.00, SD = 0.00. Note that this
final condition had the lowest level of fear and
no variance, with all participants reporting the
lowest fear level possible, similar to the amusing
stimulus with low involvement condition.
It is counterintuitive that being involved in
an amusing task would produce fear, and perhaps
something else is going on besides involvement.
To involve participants with the amusing and
control stimuli, they were instructed to make up
a story. In the involved level of the spatial
stimulus, they were asked to mentally imagine
what the patterns of dots represented without
using language, and if language came into their
heads they should label it mentally by saying,
"That's language," and then go back to a strictly
spatial task. Could it be that activating the
language centers of the cerebral cortex increases
fear, where activating the spatial areas decreases
it?
That interpretation would be consistent with
the pattern of the interaction. It could also be
that spatial stimulation has nothing to do with
the results all, and that simply removing
language-based concentration lowered fear. The
instructions for the high involvement level of the
spatial stimulus were somewhat meditative, and
perhaps that type of meditation lowers fear.

DISCUSSION
A key problem is that if language
concentration increases fear and meditative,
spatial concentration lowers fear, those are not
two ends of the same measure. They should be
viewed as entirely separate variables. That calls
into question the interaction in this experiment.
Fixing this problem would not be as easy as adding
a third factor. While spatial and language
4

FIGURE ONE
Interaction of visual stimulus and involvement level.

■ Low Involvement
■ High Involvement

Interaction of visual stimulus and involvement level. High involvement with language elaboration
had higher fear level in both the control and amusing stimulus conditions compared to the
conditions without language elaboration. However high involvement with spatial concentration
had the opposite pattern—lower fear with the high involvement task. Note that the interaction
was significant while the simple main effects were not.
A variety of other methods have been used
to measure emotions such as fear, and it has been
suggested that the best studies of emotion use
multiple measures (Davidson et al., 1999;
Fredrickson Et Levenson, 1998). Facial expressions
have been used as an indicator of type of affect
experienced by participants in some studies
(Ekman, 1997). Other researchers have
determined that facial expressions can indicate
the level or intensity of an emotion (Abe Et Izard,
1999b). Additionally, measurements of the
autonomic nervous system, such as heart rate and
skin conductivity, may help to differentiate
emotions (Ekman et al., 1983), although
researchers have questioned whether these
measures can be used to determine whether a
specific emotion is being experienced by a given
person (See Davidson, Jackson Et Kalin, 2000 for
a discussion).
Much of the prior research that formed the
basis for this experiment concerned depression
rather than fear, partly because a great deal of
the neurological study of emotion concerns

concentration may not be opposite sides of the
same coin, they cannot exist simultaneously
either. A participant cannot concentrate using
language and spatially, without language, at the
same time. If they are to be treated as separate
variables they may have to be tested individually.
The distribution of fear scores, representing
participants' self-report ratings for the word
"afraid" from the PANAS affect scale, had a strong
positive skew (Figure 2). It could be that most
people have absolutely no fear at baseline. If that
is true then this experimental design may be
incapable of detecting a result—fear could not
be reduced unless it was first induced. It could
also be that a broader range of possible responses
would shift the mean to the right, e.g. if the
response for "afraid" was rated on a scale with a
greater range of options, then perhaps average
participants would report a 2 or 3 at baseline,
instead of almost everyone reporting the lowest
category, as happened in this study. A wider scale
might spread out the distribution, which would
reduce the floor effect.
5

FIGURE TWO
Distribution of fear level scores for participants in all
research conditions.
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Distribution of fear level scores for participants in all research conditions. A fear level of 1 would
signify very little fear and 5, extreme fear. Frequency is number of participants who had that fear
level. The floor effect may cause problems in drawing conclusions from the data.
depression. Fear is not depression, although they spatially stimulating task.
may be related (Lonigan, Hooe, David, Et Kistner,
A future study might incorporate multiple
1999). The literature provides good support for measures of A A future study might incorporate
testing spatial activation in relation to negative multiple measures of both fear and amusement
affect (Henriques a Davidson, 1997), and studies in counteracting each other and in measuring
support the premise that involvement with a task changes in the relative strength of each emotion
may counteract rumination by distracting throughout the experiment. Facial expressions
participants from their negative thoughts, and could be used to detect emotional changes.
this may lessen depressed affect (Lyubomirsky
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). There is less support for been used by researchers to measure activation
testing involvement and spatial stimulation on in the amygdala, an area of the brain that has
fear, but the interaction demonstrated in this been shown to be stimulated by fear (See
study supports the idea that spatial stimulus may Davidson, 2000 for a discussion). Either facial
have an effect on fear when combined with expressions or fMRI would provide verification of
involvement. This may distract a person from the self-reported level of fear.
fearful thoughts in a manner analogous to the
In this study, researchers attempted to
relief from ruminating thoughts found in stimulate the spatial centers of the cerebral
experiments of depressed affect (Nolen- cortex. There are other ways to selectively
Hoeksema, Morrow, a Fredrickson, 1993). An stimulate the hemispheres of the brain than using
important question for further research would be verbal versus spatial stimulus. Vallar, Papagno,
whether it is involvement with a spatial task that Rusconi, and Bisiach (1995) reported a procedure
rreduces fear or if it is actually the removal of of putting warm water in one ear and cold water
language-based reduces fear or if it is actually in the other. They demonstrated that this
the removal of language-based concentration, selectively activates one hemisphere. By putting
instead. In order to test this, researchers could cold water in the left ear and warm water in the
involve participants in a procedure that avoids right ear of participants, they selectively
language elaboration but does not involve a 6 activated the spatial hemisphere. They reported

that doing the reverse activated the verbal
hemisphere. It would be interesting to determine
if this stimulation is effective for the regions that
have been shown to be less active in people with
depression (Henriques Et Davidson, 1997).

positive emotions? Review of General Psychology,
2, 300-319.
Fredrickson, B. L., a Levenson, R. W. (1998).
Positive emotions speed recovery from the
cardiovascular sequelae of negative emotions.
Cognition and Emotion, 12, 191-220.
Henriques, J. B. a Davidson, R. J. (1997).
Brain electrical asymmetries during cognitive task
performance in depressed and nondepressed
subjects. Biological Psychiatry, 42, 1039-1050.
Lonigan, C. J., Hooe, E. S., David, C. F., Et
Kistner, J. A. (1999). Positive and negative
affectivity in children: confirmatory factor
analysis of a two-factor model and its relation to
symptoms of anxiety and depression. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 67, 374-386.
Lubin, B., Fiedler, E. R., a Van-Whitlock, R.
(1999). Predicting discharge from Air Force basic
training by pattern of affect. Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 55, 71-78.
Lyubomirski, S., Caldwell, N. D., a NolenHoeksema, S. (1998). Effects of ruminative and
distracting responses to depressed mood on
retrieval of autobiographical memories. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 166-177.
Lyubomirsky, S., a Nolen-Hoeksema, S.
(1993). Self-perpetuating properties of dysphoric
rumination. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 65, 339-350.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Morrow, J., a
Fredrickson, B. L. (1993). Response styles and
the duration of episodes of depressed mood.
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102, 20-28.
Rusting, C. L., Et Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998).
Regulating responses to anger: effects of
rumination and involvement on angry mood.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,
790-803.
Tomkins, S. S. (1991). Affect Imagery
Consciousness: Volume III - The Negative Affects:
Anger and Fear. New York: Springer Publishing
Company, Inc.
Vallar, G., Papagno, C., Rusconi, M. L., a
Bisiach, E. (1995). Vestibular stimulation, spacial
hemineglect and dysphasia, selective effects?
Cortex, 31, 589-593.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., Tellegan, A. (1988).
Development and validation of brief measures of
positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,
1063-1070.

However, the hot and cold water technique may
be too broadly activating. Viewing the brain as
being two halves, the spatial and the verbal, is a
gross simplification, and physiological measures
would have to be made to determine if spatial
and verbal centers are actually being selectively
activated.
Affect can predict life success (Lubin, Fiedler,
Et Van-Whitlock, 1999), and so it is important to
study its components. Disorders related to
negative affect such as depression and those
related to fear—phobias, panic and anxiety
disorders—damage many people's quality of life.
It may be possible to stimulate and train the brain
to alleviate symptoms or even cure them. This
will help us to understand the inner workings of
the brain and the operation of the mind, and it
has the potential to improve many lives.
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